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by
Edward B. Roberts* and William R. Dyer III
ABSTRACT
18 new business R&D contracts were investigated for the effects
of considerations of follow-on potential on contract performance and
for the impacts of these factors on further contract acquisition.
The three dimensions of contract performance--schedule, cost, and
technical--correlate significantly with each other, and problems in
each area correlate with the growth in contract costs. These con-
tract problems are greatest in those cases where greatest potential
R&D and production follow-on was expected at the time of original
proposal preparation. This suggests that companies that anticipated
large follow-ons wrote into their initial R&D proposals promises of
unrealistic time schedules, cost estimates and technical performance
goals.
The general likelihood of R&D follow-ons is more accurately pre-
dictable at the time of original proposal preparation than is the
likelihood of production follow-ons. However, except for the trivial
cases in which it is clear that no follow-on potential exists, defense/
space marketing men appear unable to predict effectively the dollar
magnitude of the resulting follow-on contracts.
The greater the problems encountered during contract life, the less
the original expectation of direct follow-on from the same government
agency was realized. However, this was counterbalanced by a marked
improvement in win ratio in technically related competitions conducted
by other government agencies.
* Associate Professor, Sloan School of Management, M.I.T.
+ Research Assistant, Sloan School of Management, M.I.T.

Introduction
In the defense/aerospace contracting business, research and devel-
opment (R£cD) and production "follow-on" contracts to initial R&D con-
tracts often comprise a large portion of the typical company's total
government business. Consequently consideration of possible "follow-ons"
plays a vital role in a company's R6eD marketing decisions. In particular,
many R&D contracts are of an investigatory or feasibility study nature,
with the expected follow-on being the real reason for the initial bidding.
In addition, to stay in business a defense/aerospace firm must keep up
with new technologies and establish market positions in those technical
areas likely to grow significantly. Yet the R&D contracting business
is characterized by the high cost of breaking into a new technical area.
To some extent this is caused by widespread competitive attempts to win
new business contracts, even at high costs to the competing companies,
when large follow-on is expected. The rewards for the high entry costs
are often the expected follow-on. Knowledge and hardware gained through
performing government sponsored research are salable commodities to other
government agencies and, in the form of subcontracts, to industry. Thus
the role of follow-on contracts should be of primary concern to those
seeking to understand the performance of defense/space companies.
Summary of Original New Business Study
In 1965 a study was performed by staff members of the M.I.T.
Research Program on the Management of Science and Technology to inves-
tigate successful marketing strategies in research and development con=

tracting. During the research effort nine cooperating companies sup-
plied data on a total of 121 of their most recent competitive situations
that met the following sampling criteria:
1) R&D Research and/or development was the primary purpose of the
contract.
2) New Business The procurement would not be included if it in-
volved a direct follow-on or contract extension to contracts already
held by the company.
3) $100,000 or Greater in Bid Price The actual bids ranged from
$100,000 up to $10,500,000.
4) Prime Contract from a Federal Government Agency Subcontracts
were excluded from the sample.
5) Competitive Procurement A procurement was included if the RFP
was sent to at least two companies, regardless of the number submitting
bids.
6) Contract Awarded Pending and cancelled procurements were
excluded.
It was the intent to collect information on about twenty-five contracts
from each company. Unfortunately, far fewer suitable contracts were
For a full description of the procurements and companies involved, see
Kneissler, Norman W. , An Investigation of Marketing Strategies in the
Government R&D Industry , and Ramsaier, L. Mark, Performance Measures
and Marketing Strategies in Research and Development , unpublished S.M.
theses, M.I.T., February, 1966. Copies of either may be purchased from
the M.IoTo Microreproduction Service in Microfilm or Xerox form. A
brief summary of the above studies was presented by Edward B. Roberts
at the Boston College Conference on Marketing in the Defense Industry,
May 19, 1966, and later published as M.I.T. Working Paper #235-66, The
Measurement and Improvement of R&D Marketing Effectiveness . January, 1967,

available in the companies studied. Table 1 shows the actual number of
competitive situations that met the criteria.
Table 1. Disposition of the Awards by Company
Company
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Ramsaier^ found no significant relationship between follow-on seekers
and contract winners (Table 2)
.
Table 2. Effect of Expected Follow-on on Initial Awards
Concerned with
Follow-on Percent Won N Significance Level
Yes 17.6 68
.45
No 17.5 51
This table is interpreted as indicating that 17.67o of the 68 proposal
teams who were concerned with potential follow-on won contracts. A
similar percent (17. 5Z) of the 51 "No" answers also won contracts.
In further analyzing the original data, Dyer has found a number of
conclusions concerning follow-ons:
(1) The mean of the R&D follow-on expected by winners is statis-
tically higher than the mean of the losers
Mean expected R&D follow-on, winners = $23,440
Mean expected R&D follow-on, losers = $ 3,372
(T-test, 1-tail probability = .003)-^
This fact should be tempered by the knowledge that the data were collected
after the contracts were awarded and the winners would know more about
the agency's plans than the losers.
(2) Companies place a higher priority on contracts with expected
follow-ons in that they are more likely in those cases to establish tech-
nical contact with the customer prior to RFP receipt (p = .07).
Ramsaier, op. cit
.
,
p, 28.
^Rather than be repetitive from this point on, all reported probabili-
ties will be for one-tail tests. Thus a T-test which determined a
one-tail probability of .003 will be shown as (T-test, p <» .003).

(3) Those proposal teams without previous experience with the cus-
tomer's technical initiator or his group were more likely to bid on con-
tracts if there was expected follow-on (R&D, T-test, p = .08; Production,
T-test, p = .14). It would appear that companies who receive an RFP
without knowing the technical initiator feel they are at a disadvantage.
In these situations they mainly go after those contracts that will give
them entry to new technical areas that have good potential for later
government R&D and production follow-on business.
These conclusions initiated our interest in examining follow-ons, speci-
fically with the twenty-one winning contract situations in our original
study.
The Follow-on Study
In August, 1966, a questionnaire was sent to each of the 21 re-
spondents of the original winning proposals with the purpose of learn-
ing how the original expectations relate to the actual project history
and follow-on (so far and now expected), and how the bid-no-bid decisions
and results within the same technical area have proceeded in the year
and one-half since the awards. Eighteen questionnaires were returned
fully completed with two incomplete returns and one non-response (the
latter from Company 9 which only bid on four procurements meeting the
criteria during the original test period). For the most part the re-
mainder of this paper treats the analyses of the eighteen completed ques-
tionnaires from six different companies.
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The questionnaire contains two broad divisions: the first is con-
cerned with the performance achieved on the original R&D contract and the
second asks questions about contract follow-ons received up to the date
of questionnaire distribution (August, 1966) and follow-ons now expected
from the original contract.
Performance on the Original Contracts
Fourteen of the contracts were completed as of questionnaire response,
with the other four estimated at more than 90% complete. One-half of
the eighteen contract situations resulted in dollar growth ranging from
$1000 to $694,000 while the remaining nine received only the award price
(Table 3).
The growth tended to be found in the larger dollar volume contracts
(contracts for over $300,000). The growth slightly correlated with the
difference between the original bid and the negotiated award price, al-
though surprisingly this relationship was not significant (p = .34).
Growth was not a function of contract type as the average growth per
contract was about equal for the eight fixed price and 10 cost-plus con-
tracts in the sample. Many of the non-responses in the profit columns
are attributable to fixed price contracts. This problem and the fact
that four contracts were not complete suggested that no statistical tests
be performed on the profit data. But these data are presented in Table 3
for the reader to draw his own conclusions.
The managers of the projects had had prior orientation to their
jobs, serving in all but one case as head of the proposal team. Even
the manager of the single exception had been a contributor to the pro-

-7
*
CO
*
o
W
0]
C
o
•I-l
«
c
«
4J
X
w
u
u
u
c
o
o
•a
c
<4-l
o
u
o
>
•rJ
V
u
Pi
CO
OQ
CO
0)
I-l
asH
iJ o o
S u O
O CO o
h </>
o c
o
in 00
o:

-8
posal effort. This background of the manager agrees with the results
found by Rubin and Marquis in a study of forty-eight government sponsored
R&D projects. Despite the project managers' experiences, many changes
occurred during the projects.
In one-third of the contracts technical specifications were signi-
ficantly altered during the life of the contract, two requiring no time
extension. In one case significant changes in the program direction were
informally agreed upon to resolve differences of opinion between the two-
government technical monitors. In other cases increased work and new know-
ledge gained external to the contract were cited as change agents.
Only two contract situations indicated technical problems as the
reason for time extensions, while the rest gave the customer's expansion
of contract objectives as the cause.
In order to help us assess the nature of difficulties encountered
during the project the respondents were asked to rate on a five-point
scale the extent of problems encountered in the three areas of schedule,
cost and technical performance. The resulting data are displayed in
Table 4.
The three contract performance measures listed in Table 4 correlate
highly with each other. A non-parametric (Kendall Tau) intercorrelation
statistic was calculated for each of the three possible pairs. These re-
lationship indices are shown in Table 5 with the corresponding probability
that such a value of Tau could occur randomly.
Rubin, Irwin M- and Donald G. Marquis, Critical Decisions in the Initia -
tion of Development Projects , M.I.T. Working Paper #192-66, June, 1966,
p. 13.

Table 4. Contract Performance Ratings'*"
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each correlated with contract growth with the other measures partialed
out (i.e., the effects of variation by the third and fourth variables
upon the relation between the two variables are eliminated) . The Tau
values for the partial correlations, as listed in Table 5, indicate that
contract growth correlates truly only with cost problems.
When asked to explain the nature of those problems rated as above
average in seriousness, respondents indicated that cost and schedule
problems seemed to occur most frequently when the technical specifica-
tions were altered without adequate changes in the delivery date or money
awarded. One respondent for a contract that achieved low technical per-
formance indicated that the contract was essential to help his organiza-
tion capture a much larger development follow-on contract which the com-
pany subsequently lost.
The Predictability of Direct Follow-on
In Table 6 the direct follow-on dollars received and expected are
compared to the amounts expected approximately at the time the original
R&D contract was awarded.

11
Table 6. Direct Follow-on to R&D Contracts
($000)
R&D Follow-on Production Follow-on
Originally
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Table 7. R&D Follow-on, Originally Expected vs. Received*
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Table 9. Production Follow-on, Originally Expected vs. Received"'

The high statistical significance of the contrasting data arrayed
in Table 7 indicates that R&D marketing men are fairly good at predict-
ing whether any R&D follow-on (without regard to amount) will result
within two years. Their ability at longer range prediction, however, is
not as good, as can be seen in Table 8. The results suggest that the
original predictors of follow-on are still generally optimistic about
their future prospects (neglecting dollar volume considerations), and
they are reasonably consistent with their earlier forecasts. Tables 9
and 10 and their corresponding less significant probability levels in-
dicate low predictability by R&D competitors cf possible production out-
comes of their work. Thus we can say with a reasonable degree of con-
fidence that the marketing men cannot predict production follow-ons at
the time of R&D proposal submission. This finding suggests that possible
production follow-ons should not be weighted heavily when fixing a bid
price in an R&D competition.
The authors feel that the dollar magnitude estimates provided in the
questionnaire responses for expected follow-ons merely represent orders
of magnitude and should not be regarded as exact interval numbers (i.e.,
parametric tests are not justified). Therefore, rank-order correlations
have been performed on the original expectations against the follow-on
money received so far and that now expected. (The non-parametric Kendall
Tau test was employed in these analyses.)
If all the data of Table 6 are used (i.e., all eighteen contract
situations), the original R&D follow-on expectations are discovered to
be strongly correlated with that received so far (Tau = .34, p = .07).
In addition original expectations are closely matched by current expecta-
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tions of R&D follow-ons (Tau = .33, p = .09). However, it was felt that
even the least experienced marketing man could tell from the nature of
certain contracts that they would not involve follow-ons. On this basis
six contract situations were eliminated in which: (1) follow-on expecta-
tions were $0 originally, (2) $0 has been received so far, and (3) $0
is now expected to be received in the future (see Table 6 for these data).
The remaining contract situations are concerned in some way with
follow-ons. Here the analysis indicates that in nontrivial cases the
marketing people know little about the magnitude of expected follow-ons.
When the original R&D follow-on expectations are correlated with the follow-
on amount received so far, the resultant statistic (Tau = "250, p = .33)
indicates that the original expectations in these twelve contract situa-
tions were grossly wrong, even as to the order of magnitude of the ex-
pected research and development follow-ons. If we consider the sum of the
present expectation of future R&D follow-on (remembering that the original
contracts are for the most part completed) plus the money received so far
as our best estimate of total R&D follow-ons, we find that the original
estimates correlate even more negatively (Tau = -.272, p = .118).
It is of note that R&D marketing people do not seem to base present
expectations on money received so far (intercorrelation coefficient of
Tau = .051). Yet each correlates highly (and to the same extent) with
the sum of the two, i.e., present actual plus future expected follow-on
(Tau = .504 and Tau = .469, respectively).
The correlation of original expectation of production follow-ons with
the corresponding actual and now expected is even more negative. Although
only six contract situations were affected by nontrivial production follow-
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on considerations, the company that originally expected a $500,000,000
production contract must have made bid decisions different from what it
would have done if it had expected $0.00, which it does nowl
Follow-on Expectations vs. Project Performance
It is likely that expectations of large follow-on contracts may
have led the companies into making far too optimistic performance pro-
mises in the original R&D contract proposals. Such promises would then
augur problems in the resulting projects. We shall now look at the rela-
tionships of the various measures of performance on the original R&D con-
tract to the original expectations of follow-on.
In the questionnaire the companies rated on a five point scale the
extent of problems encountered in the original R&D contract in the three
areas of schedule, cost, and technical performance (Table 4). A rating
of one indicated that the problems were not significant while a five
meant the problems were crucial to the project.
We first looked at the rank-order correlation of the three perfor-
mance measures and the original expectations for R&D and production follow-ons
Table 11. Follow-on Expectations and Performance Problems
Problem Measure vs. Original Follow-on Expectations Tau Probability
Schedule Problems vs. R&D Follow-on Expected
Cost Problems vs. R&D Follow-on Expected
Technical Problems vs. R&D Follow-on Expected
Schedule Problems vs. Production Follow-on Expected
Cost Problems vs. Production Follow-on Expected
Technical Problems vs. Production Follow-on Expected .531
.422
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Examining the correlation of the paired variables with the others partialled
out reveals that all the above relations are indeed correlated significantly.
Based on these statistical evidences we can conclude that those companies
that expect large follow-ons submit initial proposals with unrealistic
time schedules, cost estimates, and technical performance goals in order
to capture the initial R&D award. These overoptimistic promises then in-
duce serious problems during the actual project duration.
Because both R6eD follow-on amounts received so far and the R&D money
now expected correlate so well with the sum of these two follow-on figures,
It was decided to use this sum (i.e., money received so far plus dollars
now expected) as a proxy for actual eventual total follow-on. The com-
panies were divided into those identifying a serious performance problem
(rating of four or more) and those with less serious problems (i.e., three
or less). To remove the scope of the contract as a tnajor influencing
parameter, we used the algebraic difference (i.e., + or - ) of the origi-
nal expected follow-on less the sum calculated above. The results split
on the seriousness of scheduling problems are shown in Table 12.
Table 12. Schedule Problems and Changes in Expected R&D Follow-On
(Changes shown in thousands of dollars)
Problems rated 4 or more Problems rated 3 or less
+500 -20,000 +500
+199,970
+50,000 -26,116 -900
+100
+850 -1000
+176,000 -100
A +500 indicates that one company which rated schedule problems as
high as 4 on the scale originally expected $500,000 more follow-on than
it now expects (including that already received).
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Again we treat the numeric follow-on sums as indicative only of
order of magnitude and therefore use a nonparametric test to avoid the
assumption of interval data. To test whether the two independent groups
have been drawn from the same population, we apply the Mann-Whitney U
test. For schedule problems and R&D follow-on the calculated U is 11
with p = .009. With this small amount left to chance, the researchers
conclude that serious schedule problems statistically result in the loss
of expected R&D dollars. A similar analysis of the schedule problems'
effect on loss of originally expected production follow-on resulted in
a U = 10, p = ,007. (The direction of effect is obtained from inspec-
tion of the data.) Again we conclude that schedule problems deleteri-
ously affect production contract follow-ons.
In like manner both cost problems and technical performance diffi-
culties were used to split the contract situations into comparative
groups. For both measures of performance, problems result in lowered
contract follow=>ons. The detailed results will be summarized in Table 16.
Contracts in the Same Technical Area
It was necessary to protect against double counting of follow-ons
or contracts won in the given technical areas. The possibility existed
that two or more original contract awards to one company dealt with
similar technology and that the follow-on awards attributed to both
would lead to double counting. In order to insure against such an
Ssiegel, Sidney, Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences
New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956), p. 116,
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occurrence, the technical areas of the contracts were examined as well as
the follow-ons and contracts to other agencies. Only for company 2 were
the technical areas the same for two contracts and the company expected
and received nothing in both cases.
In the two years since the original awards were made, there have
been fifty-two procurements conducted in the remaining sixteen technical
areas represented.
Table 13. Contract Opportunities in the Same Technical Area
Number of follow-on procurements conducted? R&D 51
Production
_1
Total 52
Number of sole-source awards to you? 18
Number of competitive proposals? 22 Won? 22
Number unsolicited proposals submitted?
_9 Won?
_4
In some cases awards are still pending. Taking all companies to-
gether, the technical experience gained through the initial contract cer-
tainly has been utilized by other agencies (or industry). Forty-four
follow-on or related contracts were awarded to the six companies for a
total value exceeding $28, 000, 000.
The companies were asked to breakdown their bidding in the technical
area by agency. Agency 1 (in Table 14) represents an aggregation of the
ones each company considered most important in utilizing the technology.
Agencies 2 and 3 are aggregates of the companies' second and third most
cited government organizations. Twelve original contract situations led
to bidding activity in the same technical area, six led to bids submitted
to two or more agencies, and two led to bidding to more than three agen-
cies. On the average each of the original 18 contracts studied has led
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to company bids in about three follow-on procurements. An alternate view
is that the 12 original probable nominees for follow-on have each produced
about four follow-on opportunities.
Table lA. Breakdown of Bids in Same Technical Area by Government Agency
No. of Procurements Agency 1 Agency 2 Agency 3 All other Total
Bid
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The numeric capture ratio of 41/47 = 87% of related "follow-on" com-
petitions demonstrates the value of winning an initial contract to gain
work experience and possibly a reputation in a given technical area. Even
assuming eventual loss of the five awards still not announced produces a
win ratio of 41/52 = 79%. The numeric capture ratio of the original study
was 21/121 = 17%. Even eliminating from the original study data the three
companies that were not included in this follow-on analysis gives a ratio
in the initial study of only 20/87 = 23%. The six companies in the pre-
sent sample have the following capture ratios:
Table 15. Numeric Capture Ratios*
(number of contracts won/number of contracts awarded)
_1 2_ 3 4 5 6 Mean
Original c£|pture ratio (%) 32 16 20 10 60 5 23
Follow-on capture ratio (%) 89 80 78 91 100 87
*Mann-Whitney U = 16, p = .05
Thus only company 2 has not yet gained in overall competitive effective-
ness from the government-sponsored research performed during its original
contract. In that case the reason is that no new contract yet has been
awarded in the technical areas involved. These data are biased somewhat
by including sole-source awards in the follow-on comparisons, even though
they were excluded in the initial study. However, even in the competitive
follow-ons the win record was 22 out of 30 awards for an overall capture
ratio of 73%,.
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Summarizing the Effect of Performance Problems on Follow-on
We are now ready to examine the effect of poor performance on the
loss of R&D and production follow-on to the original government contract-
ing agency and to all other government agencies (and industry). The Mann-
Whitney U statistical test was used with the following results:
Table 16. Impact of Project Performance on Follow-ons
Schedule Problems
1. Serious problems cause loss of expected direct R&D follow-on
(U = 11, p = .009).
2. Serious problems cause loss of expected direct production
follow-on (U = 10, p = .007).
3. Serious problems cause no statistically significant effect on
win-loss ratio or number of contracts won in similar technical
areas for different government agencies.
Cost Problems
1. Serious problems cause loss of expected direct R&D follow-on
(U = 18, p = .087).
2. Serious problems cause loss of expected direct production
follow-on (U = 12, p = .023).
3. Serious problems cause no statistically significant effect on
win-loss ratio or number of contracts won in similar technical
areas for different government agencies.
Technical Performance Problems
1. Serious problems cause loss of expected direct R&D follow-on
(U = 13, p = .063).
2. Serious problems cause loss of expected direct production follow-
on (U = 8, p = .012).
3. Serious problems cause no statistically significant effect on
win- loss ratio or number of contracts won in similar technical
areas for different government agencies.
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In addition, the analysis did indicate (though not statistically signi-
ficant at the .10 level) that the lack of serious problems tended to
correlate with a larger win-loss ratio for contracts awarded by other
government agencies.
Conclusions
An investigation was made using questionnaire data on proposal pre-
paration decisions, contract performance, and follow-on procurements in
18 cases of original R&D new business awards. It was found that market-
ing men are able to predict the general likelihood of later R&D follow-on
contracts more accurately than they can predict production follow-ons.
However, except for the trivial cases in which it is clear that no follow-
on potential exists, the dollar magnitude of the resulting follow-on
contracts cannot be predicted effectively. Despite the uncertainty of
these predictions consideration of the potential follow-on appears to
strongly affect aspects of the original R&D proposals, and the resulting
contracts.
In the R&D projects studied the three performance measures of
schedule, cost, and technical performance are highly intercorrelated.
The greatest performance problems in all three areas arose in those con-
tract situations in which the original expectations for direct follow-ons
were highest. The companies that anticipated large follow-ons thus appear
to have written initial R&D proposals with unrealistic time schedules, cost
estimates, and technical performance goals. The problems that were created
by not meeting these three-dimensional goals have caused loss of expected
direct follow-on contracts in both R&D and production areas.
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Yet it seems that other government agencies either do not check too
closely into the past performance of the company or are not adversely
affected by performance problems in contracts performed for other agencies.
The other agencies appear to be interested only in the fact that the com-
pany has experience in the technical area. This is suggested by the far
higher win ratio generally achieved by the companies in follow-on areas
than in the areas of original competition studied earlier. Thus in de-
ciding whether or not to "promise the moon" in a new business proposal,
R&D contractors need to balance the potential loss of some of the ex-
pected direct follow-on from the government agency awarding the initial
contract against the increased business potential that becomes available
from other government organizations once the initial contract work is
performed. This situation appears to be unfortunate to the interests of
both government and effective industrial contractors. It would be desir-
able that good R&D performance be more consistently rewarded and poor per-
formance more consistently penalized by the follow-on process.

Append ix--Questionna ire
FORM A (WON) FOLLOW-UP ON SOLICITED COMPETITIVE PROCUREMENTS
Company_
Respondent^
RFP No.
RFP Title
Original Contract Form
Title
Company Internal Pro j . No.
Technical Area
Contracting Agency_
Bid Price $______ Award Price $
Form of Final Contract (Please check if renegotiated)
^CPIF; ^Fixed Price;
(Incentive) ;
CPFF;
Fixed Price
Cost Sharing; Other (please explain)
I. Project History (If project is not completed, estimate answers where
applicable. Also please indicate here your current estimate of the
percent of job now completed
.^
)
What is the total amount received from this contract? $_
How much growth does this figure include?
In Scope $_ Beyond Scope $_
Original Negotiated Profit $_
Final Negotiated Profit $
2. What was the originally contracted completion date?_
What was the actual completion date?
what reasons for contract extensions?
If different.
1. continuation of effort
2. expansion
3. technical problems
4. other (specify please)

3.
-A2-
Were the technical specifications of the contract altered signifi-
cantly during the life of the contract? Yes^ No
How, in general?
4. Was the head of the proposal team made project manager? Yes No
If not, who was made project manager?
name title
Was he on the proposal team? Yes No
5. On a scale from 1 to 5, indicate your problems in the following areas-
Schedule12 3 4 5
problems
not significant
problems
were crucial
Cost
problems
not significant
problems
were crucial
Technical performance
problems
not significant
problems
were crucial
6. Explain the nature of tne problem in the areas for which you circled
4 or 5 for the previous question.

-A3-
II- In order to learn more about the effect of winning this contract on your
subsequent bidding, we should like to know first the immediate follow-ons
coming directly from this contract and second your bidding activity within
the same general technical area as covered by this contract.
1. What has been the total dollar volume of direct R&D follow-on from
this procurement to the same agency:
so far $ expected in next four years $
2. What has been the total dollar volume of direct production follow-on
from this procurement to the same agency
t
so far $ expected in next four years $
3. Taking all the agencies together, please answer the following questions
about all the contract opportunities that you feel to be follow-ons
to this procurement.
a. How many follow-on procurements were conducted? R&D
Production
.
"
b. Number of sole-source awards to you
c. Number competitive solicited proposals
do Number unsolicited proposals submitted
Number Won_
Number Won
Break down your bidding in the area by agency (e.g., NASA-LRC, USAF-ESD,
USA-Edgewood Ars.)
Noo Procurements
Bid
No Bid
Won
Lost
$ Won
$ Bid but Lost
$ Bid but no Award
Agency 1. Agency 2. Agency 3
.
All Other
Date Due -*
BIS 2 7 'HI
HW 5 "84
*
—
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00
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